Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
Abstract: We conjecture that suppliers favor customers accounting for a larger share of their revenues during supply chain shortages. This favoritism generates asymmetric cost shocks that reallocate market share and raise markups for important customers. We find support for this hypothesis at different aggregation levels: suppliers allocate disproportionately more shipments to important customers during delivery delays; these firms gain market share, earn higher markups, and experience superior stock returns; and ex ante concentrated industries with less elastic demand experience the strongest inflationary impulses. The supplier-favoritism channel could explain about 20% of realized U.S. CPI inflation in 2021.
In the news:
Il Sole 24 Ore, May 29, 2026
Vox-EU column, October 13, 2024
Featured in The Financial Times’ Unhedged, Greedflation the Big Questions, by Robert Armstrong, August 29, 2024
Abstract: We examine whether the strategic response to short selling by other informed investors decelerates the incorporation of positive information. We find a sizeable reduction of positive information impounding before earnings announcements for stocks more exposed to short selling. Consistent with strategic behavior, we find that investors with positive views slow down their trades when short sellers are also present. Furthermore, they break up their buy trades across multiple brokers, suggesting they wish to prevent a price impact. Thus, the strategic reaction to short selling appears to have implications for information impounding before public information releases.
Abstract: This paper proposes a novel empirical design to identify non-fundamental shocks to asset prices and studies how they can affect real economic activities. I exploit hurricanes that hit the headquarters of mutual funds and cause exogenous outflows. These outflows force mutual funds to sell their geographically distant holdings at fire-sale prices, leading to a temporary drop in abnormal returns for firms unrelated to the hurricane. I show that this non-fundamental price variation induces firms to reduce their investment. The effect on investment is permanent, not driven by financing constraints and explained by managerial market timing. These results indicate that when mutual funds outflows are unrelated to firms fundamentals, the resulting non-fundamental price variations affect firms’ real decisions.
Abstract: Populist leadership coincides with a systematic reallocation of supply-chain relationships, with firms reducing ties to domestic suppliers and domestic customers, while expanding ties to foreign suppliers